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Ex p e r ie n c e  a n d  Co n c e p t u a l  Co n t e n t  
in  Ka n t  a n d  Mc Do w e l l .
Re m a r k s  o n  "e m p t y  t h o u g h t s " a n d  "b l i n d  i n t u i t i o n s "
-  Anna Tomaszewska -
In his well-known and widely discussed (in the Anglophone philosophical 
world) book, Mind and World, John McDowell appeals to Kant's dictum about 
thoughts without content being empty and intuitions without concepts being 
blind as encapsulating the idea of conceptualism about the content of perceptual 
experience. It can be argued that the appeal might be considered inadequate, and 
that for a variety of reasons, one of them being that if Kant endorsed conceptual­
ism, along the lines of McDowell, he would be committed to retrace to the position 
he was overtly critical with, namely the position of the rationalist metaphysics; 
alternatively, he would lapse into idealism very much akin to the Hegelian one. 
This is because McDowell's conceptualism ultimately downplays the role of sensi- 
bility in mediating the relation between "mind" and "world", key to recognizing 
the limits on cognition which Kant's doctrine of transcendental idealism imposes 
upon subjects.
1. The debate about the nature of empirical content
The question concerning the nature of the content of perceptual experience 
can be formulated as the question about what it is that we come to be acquainted 
with when we see, hear, touch, smell and taste different things. Throughout the 
debate, it is assumed (1) that perceptual experience does have a content of a cer- 
tain kind and (2) that the content of experience is structured. Neither of the as- 
sumptions remains self-evident and both would require thorough examination. 
Against (1), following B. Brewer, one could propose a view "of a Berkeleyan pedi- 
gree"1 on which it would not be the case that "perceptual experience trades direct 
openness to the elements o f physical reality themselves, for some intellectual act of clas-
1 Brewer [2006] p. 9.
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sification or categorization."2 Against (2) one could point out cases in which, 
rather than presenting objects with their properties and relations between them, 
experience would present us with particular qualities alone. (For instance, imagine 
a subject who experiences only one quality, say, a certain high-pitched sound, 
throughout his entire existence -  the example does not seem to be logically inco- 
herent.)
The debate under consideration has been dominated by two opposing 
camps: conceptualists and nonconceptualists. The former hold that the content of 
perceptual experience is, at least essentially, conceptual, whereas the latter deny 
that claim. For the content of experience to be conceptual means for it either (i) to 
involve the operations of conceptual capacities, or (ii) to consist (be composed) of 
concepts. T.M. Crowther has called the two versions of conceptualism state and 
content conceptualism, respectively.3 It is not all too obvious what kind of relation 
obtains between the two kinds of conceptualism. That perception might be ac- 
companied by the relevant kind of conceptual capacities, or even necessarily entail 
a belief, does not have automatically to render perceptual content conceptual 
through and through. However, it seems that we cannot think of the content of 
one's experience as conceptual without the subject possessing at least some of the 
concepts used in the ascription of the experience to the subject.
Paradigmatically, conceptual content would be associated with proposi- 
tional content. Thus, a conceptualist would claim that experiences involve propo- 
sitions. This, in line with Crowther's distinction, one could understand in two 
ways: (i) either in the sense that to have a perceptual experience means to be in 
a mental state analogous to thinking and other intellectual activities, such as be- 
lieving or judging. The difference between thinking and similar acts, on the one 
hand, and perceiving, on the other, could be likened to a difference between (pro- 
positional) attitudes to a certain kind of content. Or (ii) the involvement of propo- 
sitions in experiences could be understood in terms of experiences themselves 
providing the "vehicles" of propositional content. The propositional content of 
experiences could then constitute the basis for the content of beliefs or judgments 
but it would not have to be identical with or even similar to it. In other words, ex- 
periences and beliefs would yield different kinds of propositions. (For example, 
a subject can experience, or sense, that there is a red and bulgy sense datum in 
front of a yellow one -  however awkward this may sound -  and, on these
2 Ibidem, p. 18 (italics mine).
3 Cf. Crowther [2006].
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grounds, say, as a result of an inductive inference, believe that there is a tomato on 
a plate.)
McDowell, who does not recognize the above distinction, expresses his con- 
ceptualist creed in the following way:
In a particular experience in which one is not misled, what one takes in is that 
things are thus and so. That things are thus and so is the content of the experience, and 
it can also be the content of a judgment: it becomes the content of a judgment if the 
subject decides to take the experience at face value. So it is conceptual content. But 
that things are thus and so is also, if one is not misled, an aspect of the layout of the 
world: it is how things are.4
According to the author of Mind and World, there is a common factor shared by 
experiences, beliefs (or judgments) and facts, namely propositional content. Facts, 
therefore, incorporate propositions, i.e. entities which prove truth-evaluable, 
thinkable contents. I do not intend to deal with the charge of idealism, frequently 
raised against McDowell's view.5 But it should be noted that the realm of facts, 
and so the range of corresponding propositions, depends, so to speak, on the kind 
of the "world" constituted by the facts. In the "world" of, e.g., Peano arithmetic, it 
is the fact that two plus three makes five, and in the "world" in which there are 
creatures equipped with the senses and sensitive to impacts of objects, it may be 
the case that there are red and bulgy sense data adjoining yellow ones. And so for- 
th. All in all, what facts can be distinguished depends on the kind of ontology one 
adopts; and what ontology one adopts may be diversely motivated.
2. McDowell's Kant
In Mind and World, McDowell constructs a dialectical opposition between 
two stances, against which background he proposes his own "midway" solution. 
Coherentism, represented by D. Davidson, cuts empirical thought off from reality, 
since it holds empirical content (sense impressions, results of the stimulations of 
sense organs) irrelevant for the justification of empirical beliefs (beliefs can be justi-
4 McDowell [1996] p. 26.
5 The charge is discussed in Smith [2002] by R. J. Bernstein, M. Friedman, C. Wright, and J.M. Bern­
stein. Friedman writes: "given McDowell's own conception of what impressions of outer sense 
amount to, I do not see, in the end, how he has fully rebutted the charge of idealism. I do not see 
why his conception itself is not finally a version of Coherentism" (p. 35). However, Wright points 
to the way in which to avoid the idealist trap: "McDowell is quite clear, as he had better be if the 
accusation of Idealism is to be as underserved as he wishes, that facts are conceptual only in so far 
as [they are] essentially conceivable" (p. 150).
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fied solely by other beliefs, on Davidson's supposition; of course, sense experien- 
tial content plays a due role in the acquisition of empirical beliefs). The Myth of the 
Given,6 in turn, apparently secures thought's grip on reality but it frustrates ra- 
tional connections between experience and thought. This, again, makes it impossi- 
ble to regard experiences as proper justifiers of empirical beliefs.
As a way to escape the pitfalls set by the opposing parties, McDowell intro- 
duces the idea of conceptualized experience. He envisages Kant as an advocate of 
the idea (or its counterpart) and one whose voice should be listened to in the re- 
cent debate on the nature of empirical knowledge. Crucial in this return to Kant is 
McDowell's appeal to what might be termed Kant's Cooperation Thesis (hence- 
forth, KCT), spelled out as follows:
The original Kantian thought was that empirical knowledge results from a co­
operation between receptivity and spontaneity. (Here 'spontaneity' can be simply 
a label for the involvement of conceptual capacities.) [...] receptivity does not make 
an even notionally separable contribution to the co-operation. The relevant con­
ceptual capacities are drawn on in receptivity [...]. It is not that they are exercised 
on an extra-conceptual deliverance of receptivity. We should understand what 
Kant calls 'intuition' -  experiential intake -  not as a bare getting of an extra- 
conceptual Given, but as a kind of occurrence or state that already has conceptual 
content.7
Also, in McDowell's Woodbridge Lectures, the above interpretative suggestion 
becomes reiterated in that the author declares:
This picture of visual experiences as conceptual shapings of visual consciousness is 
already deeply Kantian, in the way it appeals to sensibility and understanding so 
as to make sense of how experiences have objective purport.8
As one can clearly see, then, McDowell takes it that KCT allows both (1) to avoid 
the notorious Myth of the Given, by establishing the claim that there are no cogni-
6 McDowell borrows the term from W. Sellars, to be more precise: from his classic essay Empiricism  
and the Philosophy o f  Mind. There, in § 1, Sellars characterizes the "framework of givenness" and 
claims that "it has, indeed, been so pervasive that few, if any, philosophers have been altogether 
free of it; certainly not Kant, and, I would argue, not even Hegel, the great foe of 'im m ediacy'." 
Among the (immediately) "given", Sellars includes things as diverse as: sense contents, physical 
objects, universals, propositions, real connections, first principles. He admits that even the given- 
ness itself can be regarded as the "given". Cf. Sellars [1956/1995]. (References here are to the online 
edition of the text.)
7 McDowell [1996], p. 9 (emphasis mine).
8 McDowell [1998], p. 471.
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tively relevant nonconceptual, "proto-rational" episodes underlying empirical be- 
liefs, and (2) to maintain connections between thought and reality, by stipulating 
that perceptual experiences (the Kantian sensible intuitions) present us directly 
with objects. So far so good, but the question arises whether the place McDowell 
grants to KCT in his conception of experience adequately reflects the role the thesis 
plays in Kant's theoretical system; in other words, does it mean the same for both 
philosophers? Arguably, what McDowell takes as much as for granted, Kant en- 
dorsed as a result of a long development of the whole system of his philosophical 
views. It seems, indeed, that McDowell builds on the assumption of an unprob- 
lematic character of KCT, which hence needs no warrant and calls for no further 
considerations. Besides, he never worries about its coherence, as well as about the 
coherence of his own account of perceptual experience.9 For McDowell, Kant's 
claim about thoughts without content being empty and intuitions without con- 
cepts being blind10 might therefore provide an analytic truth, justified on the basis 
of the analysis of its terms, hence, given the accepted meanings of these terms, in- 
disputable. Alternatively, it might constitute an hypothesis which best explains 
the possibility of the rational connections between thought and reality.
Recently, commentators have provided arguments which both foster and 
undermine McDowell's reading. H. Ginsborg, on the basis of Kant's account of 
imagination, argues that, according to Kant, perception is accompanied by the 
"consciousness of normativity"n which originates from the understanding but 
which "does not presuppose any antecedent grasp of concepts."12 Thus, percep­
tion comes prior to concept formation and judgment (a nonconceptualist motif) 
but it is conceptually informed to the extent that it is guided by that special con- 
sciousness of normativity (a conceptualist motif). By contrast, R. Hanna, in a num- 
ber of articles, defends a nonconceptualist reading of Kant. In that he does so, he 
draws on Kant's theory of intuitions (Anschauungen) as a sui generis source of spe- 
cific cognitions -  cognitions which it would not be possible to explain otherwise 
than as presupposing intuition, i.e. a kind of immediate acquaintance with objects.
9 Importantly, McDowell does not see any problem about the application of concepts, which are 
general, to experience, which is individual and context-specific, hence particular, by its nature. 
Kant attempts to deal with this issue in the chapter on Schematism; cf. KrV, A 137/B  176 -  A 147/ 
B 187.
10 KrV, A 51 /B  75.
11 Ginsborg [2008] p. 74.
12 Ibidem.
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In particular, Hanna appeals to the doctrine of incongruent counterparts, as part of 
his argument for reading Kant in terms of nonconceptualism.13
However, Kant's account of experience, with what has been labelled Kant's 
Cooperation Thesis as one of its key constituents, can also be considered from an 
historical perspective. This might help to better understand its purport and overall 
contribution to Kant's transcendental theory of experience. Such a reading has 
been offered by M. Caimi who contends that KCT (more specifically, its first part: 
that thoughts without content are empty) is only seemingly tautological, for "Kant 
mit diesem scheinbar tautologischen Satz eine umsturzende Neuigkeit in die 
Logik seiner Zeit einfuhrt."14 The novelty consists in the fact that "[b]ei Kant 
hangen Fulle oder Leere eines Begriffs nicht mehr ausschliefilich von seiner lo- 
gischen Moglichkeit ab"15 and in the fact that "die Sinnlichkeit als legitime Erk- 
enntnisquelle anerkannt wird."16 Thus, Caimi concludes, the understanding turns 
out to be insufficient to account for all (kinds of) cognitions.
3. Kant's unconceptualized intuitions
It has been claimed by philosophers and commentators alike that Kant ad- 
opted his dualist distinction between sensibility and understanding, and conse- 
quently, the distinction between intuitions and concepts, in an arbitrary fashion. 
Indeed, when one looks into the beginning of the Transzendentale Logik, one can be 
disappointed by a mere reference to "our nature" which Kant makes as the pur- 
ported explanation of why he recognizes the distinction. For he writes:
Unsre Natur bringt es so mit sich, dafi die Anschauung niemals anders als sinnlich
sein kann, d.i. nur die Art enthalt, wie wir von Gegenstanden affiziert werden.17
L. Falkenstein remarks that "the sense/intellect distinction is not one for which 
Kant ever obviously argues, or even explains in anything more than the most per- 
functory way"18, adding that Kant must have borrowed the distinction from Aris- 
totle and the Schools. Hegel, in turn, complains that Kant based the dualism of
13 Cf. Hanna [2003], Hanna [2005], and also very recently Hanna [2011], where he attributes to non- 
-conceptual content the function of mediating our pre-reflective, proto-rational intentional related- 
ness to objects.
14 Caimi [2005] p. 141.
15 Ibidem, p. 144 (italics mine).
16 Ibidem, p. 146.
17 KrV, A 51 /B  75 (italics mine).
18 Falkenstein [2004] p. 29.
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sensibility and understanding on empirical observations and psychology of the 
human mind, thus on (what might be called) a "brute fact". In Glauben und Wissen, 
Hegel makes the point in the following way:
Kant hat keinen anderen Grund als schlechthin die Erfahrung und die empirische
Psychologie, dafi das menschliche Erkenntnisvermogen seinem Wesen nach in
dem bestehe, wie es erscheint [...].19
But it seems fairly implausible that a philosopher like Kant would overlook the 
necessity to justify an evidently unobvious, but explicitly stated claim. Rather, 
perhaps we should expect that what apparently Kant takes for granted in his ma- 
ture works has been justified and established as true in some earlier writings, and 
therefore can now be presented as obvious.20 Furthermore, Kant insists on reading 
single claims against the background of the whole system of which they form 
part,21 and with the idea of the whole ("die Idee im Ganzen"22) in mind. Thus, 
what appears as ungrounded when we abstract from the context where it belongs, 
can acquire its due justification as a part of a system.
Noteworthy, already in his pre-Critical writings, Kant abandons the idea 
that mathematics (or geometry, to be more specific) can be reduced to knowledge 
of the so called truths of reason (Leibniz's finitely demonstrable truths) or to 
knowledge of the relations between ideas, as envisaged by Hume. For instance, 
from the analysis of the concept of space, understood as a system of relations be­
tween physical objects, it does not follow that space must have three dimensions; 
the statement, for Kant, is necessarily true, though. Our knowledge that space 
must have three dimensions would rather be derived from the intuition of space, 
given "in concreto."23 In the 1768 essay on directions in space, where he counters 
Leibniz's conception of analysis situs, Kant offers a number of examples to illus- 
trate the point that certain properties of physical objects, such as directionality, 
cannot be determined by reference to mutual positions of parts of an object or to 
the positions of objects relative to one another. The examples comprise artefacts,24
19 Hegel [1968] p. 37 (341-2).
20 For an account of the evolution of Kant's arguments for his faculty dualism, see Guyer [2000].
21 "Es ist wenig daran gelegen, ob einige Satze der reinen philosophie uber das obiect wahr oder 
falsch seyn; es ist wichtiger, ob sie in der gehorigen Methode gedacht sind und im Gantzen der 
Erkenntnis ihre gehorige stelle haben, wie auf der generalcarte." Refl, AA 18:53.12-15.
22 KrV, B xliv.
23 UDGTM, AA 02:281.28.
24 E.g., a piece of writing remains legible and intelligible as long as we read it, say, from left to 
right, or from top to bottom, rather than vice versa, and so if we give it a certain direction.
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natural phenomena or creatures,25 and geometrical figures, which he terms incon- 
gruent counterparts, i.e. objects which are "vollig gleich und ahnlich, jedoch an 
sich selbst so verschieden [...], dafi die Grenzen der einen nicht zugleich die Gren- 
zen der andern sein konnen."26 One's hand and its reflection in a mirror provides 
an example of an incongruent counterpart. All in all, these examples are meant to 
show that, in our cognition, there are elements which cannot be explained in terms 
of conceptual knowledge; cognitions which do not have their origin in the under- 
standing and which cannot be justified by discursive methods. These observations, 
perhaps far from providing foolproof arguments, at least give rise to distinguish- 
ing the intellectual from the non-intellectual kind of cognition.
The distinction becomes further developed in Kant's 1770 Inaugural Disser- 
tation (De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis). There, Kant charac- 
terizes sensibility as a faculty of receptivity, dependent in what it represents on the 
affection by objects, and names the objects of the senses phenomena, whereas 
those of the understanding ("per intelligentiam cognoscendum")27 -  noumena. He 
also states that sensible cognitions present things as they appear, whereas intellec­
tual cognitions -  as they are ("sensitive cogitata esse rerum repraesentationes, uti 
apparent, intellectualia autem, sicuti sunt"28), a view to be modified in the first 
Critique. Sensible cognitions are composed of matter, furnished by sensations, and 
form, originating from a law internal to the mind and applied to the sensa in order 
to arrange, or to "coordinate" them ("lex quaedam menti insita, sensa ab obiecti 
praesentia orta sibimet coordinandi"29). Furthermore, Kant defines appearances as 
sensible cognitions which are presupposed by the logical (as opposed to the real) 
use of the understanding. Discursive cognition, which involves such acts as com- 
paring (and otherwise ordering) sense data by the understanding, he equates with 
experience. In opposition to Wolff and his school, Kant stresses that sensible and 
intellectual cognitions do not differ with regard to the degree of their distinctness; 
rather, each kind of cognition should be traced back to a different source. Kant 
denies the ability to intuit to the understanding. Intuition, pertaining to sensibility,
25 E.g., Kant notices that snails coil from left to right, and winds "vom  neuen zum vollen Lichte 
gerne von der Linken zur Rechten den ganzen Compafi durchlaufen" (GUGR, AA 02:380.22-3), in 
accordance with the law of Mariotte. Other examples concern the human body: Kant remarks that 
it is a "klare Empfindung" which allows one to distinguish between its sides (GUGR, AA 
02:381.09) or that its right side manifests more skill than the left one.
26 GUGR, AA 02:381.24-6. Kant returns to incongruent counterparts in § 13 of Prolegomena, where 
he argues for the transcendentally ideal character of space. Cf. Prol, AA 04:289.
27 MSI, AA 02:392.18.
28 MSI, AA 02:392.27-9.
29 MSI, AA 02:393.06-7.
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has its own form which makes it possible for the mind to relate to an object in an 
immediate way.30 By contrast, the understanding, with general concepts at its dis- 
posal, cognizes things discursively ("discursive"31) and by means of symbols 
(Kant qualifies it as "cognitio symbolica"32). Subsequent analyses deal with the 
idea of time ("idea temporis"33) and space ("conceptus spatii"34); both "ideas" are 
characterized as presupposed by sensible cognition, as intuitions, hence singular 
and immediately related to their objects, as pure intuitions, i.e. "untainted" by any 
sensory component, and continuous magnitudes. Also, rather than being objective 
and real, they furnish subjective conditions for ordering sense data in accordance 
with a certain law inherent in the mind. Thus, already in the 1770 Dissertation, 
Kant regards space and time as underlying all sensible representations and the 
formal principles of the "sensible world" ("principium formale mundi sensibi- 
lis"35). Moreover, Kant claims that even our grasp of the most basic principles of 
thought, such as the principle of contradiction, rests on our possessing the intui- 
tion of time.36
30 Cf. "Omnis enim intuitus noster adstringitur principio cuidam formae, sub qua sole aliquid 
immediate, s. ut singulare, a mente cerni et non tantum discursive per conceptus generales concipi 
potest." MSI, AA 02:396.21-4.
31 MSI, AA 02:396.21-4.
32 MSI, AA 02:396.19-20.
33 MSI, AA 02:398.32.
34 MSI, AA 02:402.16.
35 MSI, AA 02:405.06.
36 One may hold that, according to Kant, cognitively valuable conceptual content of judgments 
constitutively depends upon the nonconceptual content of intuitions. This empiricist motivation 
remains central to Kant's theory of cognition. It underlies the above mentioned contentious claim 
articulated in the 1770 Dissertation, which reads: "Tantum  vero abest, ut quis unquam temporis 
conceptum adhuc rationis ope aliunde deducat et explicet, ut potius ipsum principium contradic- 
tionis eundem praemittat ac sibi condicionis loco substernat. A enim et non A non repugnant, nisi 
simul (h. e. tempore eodem) cogitata de eodem, post se autem (diversis temporibus) eidem 
competere possunt. Inde possibilitas mutationum nonnisi in tempore cogitabilis, neque tempus 
cogitabile per mutationes, sed vice versa." MSI, AA 02:401.12-18. It might be objected that Kant is 
wrong inasmuch as he does not recognize that a given "A and not-A" can be inconsistent, whether 
anyone has noticed the contradiction, or not, thus independently of the psychological process of 
understanding which indeed occurs in time. (Contradictions in mathematical proofs would pro- 
vide an adequate example.) But Kant might have two things to say in order to defend his position: 
(i) concepts are representations, "tools" by means of which to comprehend mind-independent 
realities, hence one cannot consider concepts and conceptual relations in abstraction from the cog- 
nitive processes in which they are exercised (and these processes are temporal); (ii) conceptual rela- 
tions unaccompanied by intuition fail to meet the requirement of objective validity, and in the 
passage quoted at stake is cognition of the empirical world, i.e. cognition which demands the co- 
operation of concepts and intuitions. In other words, Kant would consider here the application of 
the principle of contradiction to the mundus sensibilis.
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The dualist distinction between sensibility and understanding, which 
Kant's discovery of the pure forms of sensibility seems to have given rise to, is 
brought to light several times in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft. For instance, Kant 
mentions it in the Stufenleiter passage, where he divides conscious representations 
(perceptions) into sensations, i.e. subjective modifications of the mind, and cogni­
tions (Erkenntnisse), which he qualifies as objective. Cognitions are either intuitions 
or concepts. Intuitions directly refer to objects and are singular. Concepts are me- 
diate and refer to objects by means of a mark ("Merkmal"37) which can be common 
to a number of objects. Emphasis on concepts and intuitions constituting different 
forms of cognizing an object is also evident in Kant's famous example with a "sav- 
age" which we can find in the Jaesche edition of his lectures on logic:
Sieht z. B. ein Wilder ein Haus aus der Ferne, dessen Gebrauch er nicht kennt: so 
hat er zwar eben dasselbe Objekt wie ein Anderer, der es bestimmt als eine fur 
Menschen eingerichtete Wohnung kennt, in der Vorstellung vor sich. Aber der 
Form nach ist dieses Erkenntnifi eines und desselben Objects in beiden ver- 
schieden. Bei dem einen ist es blofie Anschauung, bei dem Andern Anschauung 
und Begriff zugleich.38
Finally, to complete the account of the Kantian unconceptualized intuitions: let us 
remember that, closing the introduction to the first Critique, Kant spells out what 
we may call a Priority Thesis in that he contends that "die Bedingungen, worunter 
allein die Gegenstande der menschlichen Erkenntnis gegeben werden, denjenigen 
vorgehen, unter welchen selbige gedacht werden."39 Since temporal precedence 
must be ruled out here (in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Kant does not take much 
interest in the genetic aspects of human cognition), as must be any merely logical 
dependence of concepts on intuitions (as in the account of Spinoza, where modi 
logically depend on substance), what seems to be at stake is a kind of a constitutive 
dependence of concepts on intuitions; for concepts acquire object-relatedness ex- 
clusively by virtue of their relation to intuition.
4. "Empty thoughts" and "blind intuitions"
In the famous dictum which inspired McDowell's conceptualism, Kant 
claims that thoughts without content are empty and intuitions without concepts
37 KrV, A 320/B  377.
38 Log, AA 09:033.17-22.
39 KrV, A 16/B  29.
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are blind.40 Yet, according to the evidence adduced in the previous section, it 
seems that Kant's Cooperation Thesis cannot be taken as true without qualifica- 
tions. In the Stufenleiter passage, concepts are described as representations which 
refer to objects, so to speak, by definition alone. Likewise, the "savage" example 
shows that intuitions have their objects without it being the case that there must be 
concepts which become associated with them. It seems, therefore, that concepts 
and intuitions have their own kind of content each, irrespective of KCT.
Let us deal with thoughts (concepts) unaccompanied by intuitions first. For 
sure, Kant does not pretend to claim as much as that they make no sense at all. On 
the contrary: we do understand them insofar as we understand all thoughts which 
do not thwart the principle of contradiction (such is, e.g., the thought that space 
has more than three dimensions).41 Such thoughts may even have some objective 
content -  in the sense in which the idea of God, in Descartes' Meditation III, has 
objective content before the proof of God's existence has been carried out. But 
what empty thoughts lack is reference to a real (as opposed to what some philoso- 
phers call merely intentional) object. For, as one can read in the chapter on phe- 
nomena and noumena:
Zu jedem Begriff wird erstlich die logische Form eines Begriffs (des Denkens) 
uberhaupt, und denn zweitens auch die Moglichkeit, ihm einen Gegenstand zu 
geben, darauf er sich beziehe, erfordert. Ohne diesen letzteren hat er keinen Sinn, 
und ist vollig leer an Inhalt, ob er gleich noch immer die logische Funktion enthal- 
ten mag, aus etwanigen datis einen Begriff zu machen. Nun kann der Gegenstand 
einem Begriffe nicht anders gegeben werden, als in der Anschauung [...].42
Moreover, thoughts (concepts) unaccompanied by intuitions represent logically 
possible objects. But, importantly, logically possible objects are not really possible 
objects. To be really possible, an object must conform not only to the conditions of 
thought but also to the conditions of sensibility, very much diverse from the for- 
mer. Thus, Kant takes a significant step in the history of the rationalist metaphys- 
ics: by rendering our cognition of reality constrained by the a priori conditions of 
sensibility, he deprives thought, divorced from experience, of its usurped power
40 KrV, A 51 /B  75.
41 In fact, the issue is slightly more complicated: in the Transzendentale Dialektik, Kant talks about 
problematic concepts which we can apply to the objects of the transcendental ideas (soul, God, the 
world as a whole). Such concepts do not generate knowledge, since they cannot be associated with 
any intuitions. Cf. KrV, A 339/B  397 -  A 340/B  398.
42 KrV, A 239/B  298.
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to cognize any reality.43 Otherwise put: Kant's revolution consists in bringing 
down the rationalist dogma which equates being (ens) with possible being (ens 
possibile).44 Real possibility becomes explicitly set against mere logical possibility 
in the following passage from Preisschrift uber die Fortschritte der Metaphysik:
Die [M]oglichkeit eines Gedankens oder Begriffs beruht auf dem Satze des Wider- 
spruchs [...]. Das Ding, wovon selbst der blofie Gedanke unmoglich ist (d.i. der Be- 
griff sich widerspricht), ist selbst unmoglich. Das Ding aber, wovon der Begriff 
moglich ist, ist darum nicht ein mogliches Ding. Die erste Moglichkeit kann man 
die logische, die zweyte die reale Moglichkeit nennen; der Beweis der letztern ist 
der Beweis der objectiven Realitat des Begriffs, welchen man jederzeit zu fordern 
berechtigt ist. Er kann aber nie anders geleistet werden, als durch Darstellung des 
dem Begriffe correspondirenden Objects; denn sonst bleibt er immer nur ein Ge- 
danke, welcher, ob ihm irgend ein Gegenstand correspondiere, oder ob er leer sey, 
d.i. ob er [u]berhaupt zum Erkenntnisse dienen konne, so lange, jenes in einem 
Beyspiele gezeigt wird, immer ungewifi bleibt.45
Now, let us turn to the other part of Kant's famous statement, which says that in­
tuitions without concepts are blind. Literally, blindness consists in the lack of the 
ability to see. Also, perhaps slightly less literally, one can be blind to certain things 
or facts -  in the sense that one, purposefully or not, would omit or neglect these 
things or facts which anyway there are for one to experience. A colour-blind per­
son cannot discriminate, say, blue from green. Drawing on this analysis, based on 
commonsensical observations, one could read Kant's contention as implying that:
(i) without concepts applied to perceptions, subjects are unable to perceptually 
experience objects, as much as a blind person is unable to see anything (with his 
eyes); or that (ii) without relevant concepts, "attached", as it were, to intuitions, 
one fails to take account of the content of one's experience in its variety and rich- 
ness (one would not, then, be aware of particular x-s and y-s, given in experience, 
but one would be only vaguely aware that there is something); or, which is similar 
to the previous claim, that (iii) lacking concepts, one cannot be dicriminatively
43 This attainment may, in fact, be regarded as echoing Hume's empiricist postulate to reject all 
ideas for which we cannot point to any corresponding impressions. Of course, Kant's insistence on 
the necessary (a priori) character of the forms of sensibility makes the difference; Hume may re- 
gard the cognitive mechanisms which he describes as acquired in the course of evolutionary proc- 
esses.
44 Perzanowski [1994] highlights the rationalist conception of ens as ens possibile in his commentary 
on Leibniz's theological philosophy.
45 HN, AA 20:325.29-38, 326.01-3.
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aware of what is actually presented to one in experience, analogously to a person 
who, while lacking the concepts "red" and "violet", fails to distinguish red objects 
from violet ones.
However, read in this way, Kant's contention would go against the grain of 
much of his otherwise clearly stated views (already discussed in section 3). For 
Kant did not consider unconceptualized intuitions unfit to represent objects and 
properties in a variety and richness of their details. On the contrary, against Leib­
niz^ doctrine of a complete concept, Kant holds the view that intuitions are, to use 
a contemporary turn of phrase, much "richer" representations than concepts:
Da nur einzelne Dinge oder Individuen durchgangig bestimmt sind: so kann es 
auch nur durchgangig bestimmte Erkenntnisse als Anschauungen, nicht aber als 
Begriffe, geben; in Ansehung der letztern kann die logische Bestimmung nie als voll- 
endet angesehen werden.46
What should we understand by "blind intuitions", then, if not mental occurrences 
or states which, by themselves, do not represent anything? The issue of "blind- 
ness" reemerges in the A-edition version of the transcendental deduction of the 
categories, where Kant remarks that a manifold of unsynthesized perceptions 
"wurden [...] zu keiner Erfahrung gehoren", and thus would be "ohne Objekt"47, 
hence "nichts als ein blindes Spiel der Vorstellungen, d.i. weniger, als ein Traum.''48 In 
the context of the transcendental deduction of the categories where the statement 
appears, it means that blind intuitions would not belong to experience because 
they would not represent objects subordinated to the rules (concepts) and princi- 
ples of the understanding. All intuitions, prior to their being subordinated to the 
understanding, must be blind: this means that they cannot represent objects (states 
of affairs) which, e.g., could remain in causal connections with other objects (or 
states of affairs), or any other relations specified by the categories.49
But this does not come down to stating that, according to Kant, e.g. the very 
ability to see red (or just seeing red) presupposes that the subject possess the con-
46 Log, AA 09:99.13-16.
47 Kant employs the terms "O bjekt" and "Gegenstand" interchangeably, in the first Critique, as the 
equivalent of the English term "object". Therefore, if one attempts to read into Kant's text the dis­
tinction between intentional and real objects (or what modern philosophers referred to as the objec- 
tive existence of an object in the mind, on the one hand, and its formal existence without the mind, 
on the other), one should be more sensitive to the context rather than the terms in which the dis- 
tinction is outlined.
48 KrV 112 (italics mine).
49 R. Hanna in Hanna [forthcoming] calls the objects of unconceptualized intuitions elusive objects.
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cept "red" and the ability to employ it in judgments. Seeing red objects is not logi- 
cally dependent upon believing or judging that the objects are red, just because 
intuitions are in no way logically dependent on concepts. What Kant says, there- 
fore, is only that unconceptualized intuitions lack cognitive value. As such, they 
could not be used to justify our empirical beliefs. To remind McDowell's observa- 
tion: there can be no logical (in particular justificatory) relations between the mere 
"given" and our empirical beliefs based on it. However, this by no means entails 
that "receptivity does not make an even notionally separable contribution to the 
co-operation [between the senses and the understanding]", nor that "the relevant 
conceptual capacities are drawn on in receptivity."50 On the contrary: unconceptu- 
alized intuitions contribute their own kind of content. To use an analogy with neu- 
roscience and cognitive psychology: it is as though concepts were there to account 
for "binding" different features of objects, registered separately in different areas 
of the brain. It is not registering the features that presupposes binding; conversely, 
binding appears as a "higher order" cognitive process emerging from the brain's 
being responsive to the diverse features, which then become synthesized into an 
experience of an object.51
5. Was Kant then a nonconceptualist?
At the beginning of this paper, I referred to the suggestion that we should 
distinguish state and content conceptualism (by parity, we may now distinguish 
state and content nonconceptualism) about the nature of perceptual experience. To 
recap: according to state conceptualism, perceptual experiences involve concep­
tual capacities; e.g., to see a red tomato means to see that the tomato is red. Percep- 
tion, on that account, resembles belief or judgment in that it too involves a propo- 
sition made by the subject. Thus conceived, perception is a form of the awareness 
of facts. Content conceptualism, in turn, would amount to the claim that the con- 
tent of perceptual experience consists of (or is constituted by) concepts. What 
normally consists of concepts are propositions. What propositions capture are 
facts. The latter make up the "world", providing the frame of reference for our 
beliefs or judgments.
According to KCT, concepts combined with intuitions render the content of 
experience cognitively valuable. Concepts secure the rationality of the relations 
between experience and thought; and (sensible) intuitions furnish the empirical
50 McDowell [1996] p. 9.
51 For the application of Kant's theory of cognition to the problem of binding in neuroscience and 
cognitive psychology, see: LaRock [2010].
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content, hence they guarantee the grip on the "world". Thus, Kant's account aptly 
satisfies the two requirements: for rationality and for object-relatedness, and this is 
what McDowell finds so attractive about the Kantian dictum. However, the coop- 
eration between concepts and intuitions in experience does not arise, according to 
McDowell, from merging, as it were, the two kinds of representational content. 
Somewhat in a Berkeleyan vein, he claims that we even cannot think about intui- 
tions as separate from thoughts, as concept-independent. A Hegelian idiom may 
be appropriate here: for we might regard the empirical content as posited in the 
course of reflection about the nature of experience. But precisely for this reason it 
cannot be construed as genuine content. In this way, we come to a conclusion 
which Kant most probably would like to avert. For if we no more than posit the 
empirical content as partly constitutive of our cognition of objects, we leave it un- 
explained why Kant insisted on sensibility constraining the claims to knowledge 
entertained by the understanding. And the idea that the bounds of (cognitively 
valuable) thought must be determined by the limitations intrinsic to our nature as 
sensible creatures remains key to understanding the Kantian doctrine of transcen- 
dental idealism. Without it, Kant would go back to the rationalist, Leibnizian- 
Wolffian, positions or lapse into the Hegelian kind of idealism.
Was Kant then a nonconceptualist? It might be difficult to answer this ques- 
tion, since there seems to be no unitary account of nonconceptual content in the 
recent literature on the topic. Indeed, what nonconceptual content is, is a subject 
matter of an ongoing debate which it is not my purpose to elaborate on here.52 By 
way of an illustration, let me just briefly consider an instance of what has been 
called state and content nonconceptualism.
State nonconceptualism, as I see it, one can attribute to F. Dretske; in 
a number of essays on perception, he distinguishes thing-awareness from fact- 
awareness.53 Simple seeing of an object, property or relation, which he identifies as 
thing-awareness, does not entail or presuppose seeing that an object has a certain 
property or that some objects form a relation of a definite kind, which he identifies 
as fact-awareness. Arguably, we often perceive things without recognizing any or 
at least some of the facts about them: think about meeting a friend, who always (as 
you have otherwise got to know) wears a tie in his office, without being able to 
say, shortly after the meeting, what colour your friend's tie was (and let's suppose 
that you do not suffer from anterograde amnesia). Or think about the all too well 
known instances of change blindness and inattentional blindness, such as the story
52 For an overview of existing standpoints and arguments in the debate, see: Gunther [2003].
53 Cf., e.g., Dretske [1993]; Dretske [1995, 2000].
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with a man in a gorilla suit dancing a jig on a playground without being noticed 
by observers counting how many times basketball players pass the ball to one an- 
other.54
Content nonconceptualism can be illustrated by Ch. Peacocke's account of 
scenario content. A scenario is a possible way of perceiving the scene around the 
subject, a way which is determined by relations between the body of the subject 
and his environment.55 For instance, a person looking at the Buckingham Palace, 
whilst standing in front of the edifice, and a person looking at the Palace with his 
head turned left towards it should be ascribed two different scenario contents, 
even though they see the same thing.56 For the experiences of both persons would 
be subject to different correctness conditions. Thus, according to Peacocke, scenar- 
ios form part of the content of perceptual experience precisely because they have 
correctness conditions:
I use the phrase 'the content of experience' -  he explains -  to cover not only which 
objects, properties, and relations are perceived, but also the ways in which they are 
perceived. The ways [...] all contribute to the representational content of experi- 
ence. That is, when something is perceived in one of these ways, the claim that the 
object really is the way it is experienced as being is one which has a correctness 
condition.57
Although one might hesitate to read Kant as an adherent of state nonconceptual- 
ism (in the transcendental deduction of the categories he aims to establish the 
claim that all experience must involve the categories of the understanding, and so 
the conceptual capacities), he can certainly be regarded as an advocate of content 
nonconceptualism. For intuitions do "contribute to the representational content of 
experience"; without intuitions, no real objects could be represented by concepts 
alone. Space and time, the forms of all empirical intuitions and pure intuitions 
themselves, yield the ways in which objects can be experienced as endowed with
54 I borrow this funny example from Tye [2005].
55 Here is how Peacocke defines a scenario: "W e are now in a position to say with slightly more 
precision what one of our spatial types is. It is a way of locating surfaces, features and the rest in 
relation to such a labelled origin and family of axes. I call such a spatial type a scenario”, in: Pea- 
cocke [1992], p. 107. "Origin" and "axes" are Peacocke's terms of art naming specific abstract enti- 
ties. Intuitively, the notion of origin refers to the point on which to orientate or center a scenario, 
like the centre of one's chest or palm for visual and tactile experiences. Axes would then be consti- 
tuted by lines dividing one's perceptual field in relation to the origin, e.g. back/ front, left/right or 
up/dow n.
56 This is of course Peacocke's example and can be found in Peacocke [1992].
57 Peacocke [2001] p. 241.
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a variety of other, not only spatial and temporal characteristics. These ways of rep- 
resenting objects cannot be reduced to, or substituted by any act of the under­
standing. They must then be what renders at least part of the content of our ex- 
perience independent from the concepts we have mastered.58
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